Chapter VI
CAMP DIX AND DEMOBILIZATION
“The collapse of the Central Powers came more quickly
than even the best-informed military experts believed possible.” 1 (U.S.
Secretary of War 1tr. To U.S. Senator James A. Reed, 3 April 1919.)
Thus, wrote Secretary of War Newton D. Baker in a
letter to Senator James A. Reed about the suddenness of the armistice on 11
November 1918. The abrupt end of the war found the United States even less
prepared for demobilization than it had been for mobilization in April 1917.
When the war ended, there was only one officer,
Colonel C. H. Conrad, Jr. in the entire United States Army actively working on
plans for personnel demobilization, and he had received the assignment only one
month previously.
General Peyton C. March, chief of staff, US Army, in
speaking of the planning for demobilization said, “…There were no precedents
afforded by the experience of our former wars which were of value in
determining policy.” 2 (Peyton C. March, The Nation at War, p. 312)
Except the Civil War, no war in which the United
States previously participated had involved the mass of personnel comparable to
the millions who served in World War I. Then, too, the opportunities of
economic and territorial expansion in the nation that existed after the Civil
War were not available to the men released in 1918-19.
The War Department planners considered the welfare of
the nation as well as the Army and concluded that demobilizing the emergency
troops could be best accomplished in one of four ways: soldiers could be
separated by length of service, by industrial needs or occupation, by locality
(through the use of local draft boards), or by military units.
The decision favoring the military unit method of
demobilization was made on 16 November 1918 and immediately announced to the
press. The secretary of war, describing the plan in his report for 1919, said,
‘…the policy adopted was to demobilize by complete organizations as their
services could be spared, thus insuring the maximum efficiency of those
organizations remaining, instead of demobilizing by special classes with the
resulting discontent among those not given preferential treatment and retained
in the service, thus lowering their morale and efficiency and disrupting all
organizations with the attendant general discontent,’ 3 (U.S. Secretary of War,
War Department Annual Report 1919, vol. I, pt. I, p. 14)
Demobilization Centers, such as Camp Dix became on 3
December 1918, performed the task of discharging the troops. At these centers
camp personnel conducted physical examinations, made up the necessary papers to
close all records, checked property, adjusted financial and other accounts, and
generally completed the processing. Many units in the United States were not
immediately released. They manned ports of embarkation, convalescent and
demobilization centers, supply depots, base and general hospitals, garrisons
along the Mexican border, and bases outside the United States.
Camp Dix personnel had a taste of the inactivation
process even before it was designated a Demobilization Center. This occurred on
30 November 1918 with the official inactivation of the 102nd
Infantry Division, the new division scheduled for formation at Camp Dix that
never got beyond assignment of cadre. In December 1918 demobilization got
underway in earnest with the inactivation of the 333rd, 334th,
338th, 339th, and 346th Light Tank Battalions;
the 351st 382nd, 383rd Heavy Training and
Replacement Companies; and the 319th,,320th,321st
Tank Repair and Salvage Companies. These tank units were elements of the 309th
and 310th Tank Centers, which only had been transferred to Camp Dix
in November 1918. They were part of the final war plan to augment tank
participation of the A.E.F. in France during the scheduled 1919 buildup of
United States forces. Although these organizations had received cadres of some
trainees, systematic training barely began before the units were inactivated.
The two Tank Center Headquarters remained at Camp Dix for a time, but they,
too, were inactivated in June 1919.
Demobilization really got underway at Camp Dix
beginning in January 1919. In quick succession, seven entire infantry divisions
or their major elements were inactivated in the next six months. They were the
87th Infantry Division, January to March; 41st Infantry
Division, February to March; 28th Infantry Division, April to May;
42nd Infantry Division, May; 29th Infantry Division, May;
78th Infantry Division, the first occupants of Camp Dix, May to
June; and the 79th Infantry Division, May to June.
During the same period, inactivation of the following
smaller units was accomplished at Camp Dix; 10 engineer regiments, two engineer
trains, 26 transportation corps companies, three pioneer infantry regiments,
one infantry brigade headquarters, six machine gun battalions, 30 base
hospitals, four military police companies, two butchery companies, eight sales
commissary units, and 14 U.S. guards battalions.
More than 300,000 men were discharged at Camp Dix by
31 July 1919. Of this number 16,485 were officers and 39 field clerks (similar
to today’s warrant officer). In addition, 76,124 officers and men were
transferred to other stations for reassignment or further processing prior to
discharge. The largest number of discharges for a day was 5, 231 and transfers
4, 617.
Although the size and number of units inactivated
during the period 1 July to 31 December 1919 began to fall off, the scale of
inactivations continued to be significant. They included: nine engineer
regiments, 63 transportation corps companies, two pioneer infantry regimens,
six base hospitals, five ambulance service sections, 25 military police
companies, 13 butchery companies, and eight sales commissary units. By October
1919, the demobilization requirements at Camp Dix had slowed to a point where
no more than 500 men were handled per day. The War Department already had
acquiesced in the requirement that a man be discharged within 48 hours of his
arrival at the center.
It was in October that Camp Dix was chosen by the Treasury
Department to be the site for filming of movies in support of the “Fifth
Liberty Loan Drive.” More than $100,000 was invested in filming simulated
battles with doughboys dressed in German battle dress.
Scenes took place in the mock trench area near the
filtration plant at New Jersey Avenue beyond 8th Street. The trench
area, which circled eastward toward Pointville and included heavily wooded
terrain, afforded an ideal setting for producing battle scenes reminiscent of
those fought on the Western Front.
By the end of January 1920, demobilization at Camp Dix
had come to an end.
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